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Abstract--The choice of a vocational specialization  at school is often hampered  by the need for labor 
market  information which  is not available.  This article investigates whether students  of the Dutch junior 
secondary  technical schools anticipate  future  labor market  situations.  We try to answer this question by 
introducing  two extreme models: the cobweb model and  the rational  expectations model. By using the 
estimation results,  the extent of the information  problem is measured,  indicating  large mismatches due 
to unanticipated  changes in the labor market.  These results  suggest the importance of additional  public 
labor market forecasts  to assist  students' choices. [JEL  I21, J24] 
I. INTRODUCTION 
THE  DECISION to  invest  in  human  capital  is  a  very 
difficult one.  Human  capital  theory gives inadequate 
attention  to the ways in which  students  form expec- 
tations  about future labor market variables. From the 
human  capital  point  of  view,  wages  incorporate  all 
the  information  relevant  for the  individual's  invest- 
ment decision, apart from individual preferences. 
In the  real  world,  however,  students  face two big 
problems  in  their  decision  to  invest  in  their  human 
capital.  The  first  difficulty  is  the  absence  of  infor- 
mation  about  wages  that  would  reflect the  value of 
their schooling at the moment they will enter the labor 
market.  The  wages that  can  be observed  are present 
wages  for present  labor,  which  will certainly  be  an 
indication  of  future  wages,  but  an  imperfect  indi- 
cation.  Lack  of  information  may  lead  to  imperfect 
anticipation.  The most extreme effect of this discrep- 
ancy  is  described  in  the  so-called  "cobweb-theory", 
in  which  it  is  assumed  that  participants  make  no 
allowance  at  all for differences  between  the present 
labor market  signals  and the likely future  situation. 
A  second difficulty arises because the labor market 
is not,  as  assumed  by the neo-classical theory,  com- 
pletely cleared  by  wages.  In  other  words,  wages  do 
not  reflect  all  relevant  information.  Thus,  students 
need  additional  information  to decide  how  to  invest 
in their human  capital. 
It is of course  important  for students  to anticipate 
future developments on the labor market as correctly 
as  possible.  The  considerable  difficulties which  they 
face in forming adequate anticipations might create a 
need  for medium-term  forecasts  of the  labor market 
situation of various types of education (see, for exam- 
ple,  Freeman,  1971,  p.  229).  Rosen  (1987,  p.  179) 
stresses  the  difficulties  students  face  in  expectation 
formation. He compares investments in human capital 
with  other  investments  in  buildings  or  production 
capacity and concludes  that: 
There is an important difference between the two. Busi- 
ness investment activities in the private sector are placed 
in the hands of a relatively small cadre of highly trained 
and  highly skilled professionals.  These people continu- 
ally obtain market feedback on the wisdom of their judg- 
ments and  repeatedly revise and revalue their decisions 
as  new  information  comes  available.  Education 
decisions,  on the other hand, are squarely in the hands of 
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young people and their parents. They are usually made at 
early stages of life, before the acquisition of significant 
practical experience, and do not continually occur. 
There  have  been  many  attempts  in  the economic 
literature to measure students' response to labor mar- 
ket circumstances. Freeman (1971), Freeman (1975a), 
Freeman  (1975b),  Psacharopoulos  (1973),  Scott 
(1979),  Hansen  et  al.  (1980),  Leffler  and  Lindsay 
(198 !),  Matilla  (1982),  Fiorito  and  Dauffenbach 
(1982),  Siow (1984),  Huffman  and  Orazem  (1985), 
Zarkin (1985), Paulsen and Pogue (1988), and Staple- 
ton (1989) measure the wage elasticity of enrollment 
in  academic  education  by  use  of  time-series.  Tin- 
bergen (1974)  measures this elasticity by comparing 
different countries. Willis and Rosen  (1979),  Kodde 
(1985) and Whitfield and Wilson (1991) use individ- 
ual data. The wage elasticity of enrollment found in 
these studies varies from roughly 0.5  to 2.0.  Only a 
few  studies also measure  the elasticity with respect 
to  the  probability of getting  a job.  Freeman  (1980) 
derives an  elasticity, based on  time  series, of 0.29, 
while  Kodde (1985)  calculates an  elasticity of 2.33 
based on individual data. To be able to measure the 
enrollment  elasticity, all  these  studies  have  to  take 
into account the way students anticipate future devel- 
opments of wages or employment opportunities. Most 
studies  use,  at  least implicitly, cobweb  or adaptive 
expectations. Only Siow (1984),  Zarkin  (1985),  and 
Stapleton (1989)  provide a  model based on  rational 
expectations. 
Although both theories recognize the possibility of 
forecast errors, they have very different policy impli- 
cations.  In a  cobweb  model  students  make  forecast 
errors  due  to  their  inability to  forecast  adequately, 
while  in  a  rational  expectations model  students  do 
predict all changes  which  are  predictable given the 
data  that  is  available.  The  latter  model  therefore 
leaves no place for a public forecast to assist students, 
since the professional forecaster can do no better than 
the student himself. The only exception to this is the 
possibility to provide more data to  students.  In that 
case it is not the forecast but the raw data which has 
additional value. In the  cobweb  model,  however,  it 
might  be  possible  for  a  professional  forecaster  to 
improve students'  forecasts, and thereby to improve 
the match between supply and demand on the labor 
market. 
The  choice of the expectation formation mechan- 
ism is, however, for most studies only a tool in order 
to be able to estimate the enrollment elasticities. Slow 
(1984)  tests  the  correctness  of  his  rational  expec- 
tations model, but Connelly (1989)  has been able to 
reject this interpretation. Zarkin (1983) compares the 
cobweb model with the rational expectations model, 
but his preference for the rational expectations model 
is based on theoretical arguments. None of these stud- 
ies leads to a measurement of the size of the disequili- 
bria which occur due  to  wrong expectations, which 
might  indicate the need for expert forecasts to help 
students in their educational choices. The only study 
which  does  measure  the  loss  due  to  wrong  expec- 
tations is Freebairn and Withers (1979). Based on sur- 
plus calculations they estimate a loss of 2% to 9% of 
income during the first 10 years at work. Their model 
is  based  on  cobweb  specifications  from  Freeman 
(1971)  and  Freeman  (1975a),  and  again  the  cor- 
rectness  of  this  cobweb  specification  is  simply 
assumed. 
The aim of this article is to investigate, empirically, 
the use of labor market information by students, who 
are  making  a  choice between  alternative vocational 
specializations,  and  based  on  this  to  measure  the 
extent of the disequilibria due to errors in their expec- 
tations.  The  focus  in  this  study  is  on  Dutch junior 
secondary  technical  education, j  Junior  secondary 
technical education is vocational, in contrast to all the 
studies mentioned above, which deal with academic 
studies.  The  vocational  character  of  these  schools 
enables us to assume that the various specializations 
that can be chosen lead to specific labor market seg- 
ments. This implies that the decision to specialize is 
a  crucial  moment  in  the  course.  By  specializing, a 
student excludes the alternative specializations. It is 
obvious that, even more than for most academic stud- 
ies, the information problem in this situation is very 
important. 
To  investigate the  information  problem,  we  wilt 
measure, based on aggregated time-series, the extent 
to  which  the  labor market  situation plays a  role  in 
the choice of a  vocational spe.cialization. As noticed 
above,  in a  world in  which markets are not cleared 
completely by wages, other aspects might also influ- 
ence the allocation process. In this study two aspects 
will be taken into account: the wages and the prob- 
ability of getting a job. In other words, the question is 
whether wages and unemployment in a certain market 
segment provide signals for students about the pros- 
pects of jobs, signals which regulate the coordination 
between demand and supply. 
A  second problem regarding the extent of the mis- 
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students  form  these  expectations.  As  mentioned 
above,  economic  theory  about  student  choices  pro- 
vides  us  with  two  extreme  positions,  the  cobweb 
model,  propagated  by  the  well-known  models  of 
Freeman, and the rational expectations model of, e.g., 
Siow (1984)  and Zarkin (1985).  In this article both 
models are tested and their hypotheses about expec- 
tation formation are tested. 
Based on these tests and estimation results, which 
are in favor of the cobweb model, the number of stu- 
dents  who  made  a  wrong  decision due  to  incorrect 
labor market anticipations is calculated. These num- 
bers  indicate  the  potential  gains  from  public  labor 
market  forecasting.  The  question  of  the  extent  to 
which public forecasts could fill this expectation gap 
will  not  be  taken  into  account.  For  this  important 
question see, e.g., Ascher (1978), Ahamad and Blaug 
(1973),  and Debreauvais and Psacharopoulos (I 985). 
The  structure  of this  article is  as follows. In  the 
second section the information problem will be ana- 
lyzed and a model will be formulated which describes 
the  choice  problem.  Section  3  deals  with  the  esti- 
mation  procedure  and  section  4  provides  the  esti- 
mation results. In the fifth section the implications of 
these results will be investigated with respect to the 
possible  gains  from  additional  labor  market  infor- 
mation. Finally some conclusions are drawn. 
2. THE PROBLEM  OF INFORMATION 
At Dutch junior secondary technical schools, stu- 
dents  start  with  a  general  curriculum  of two  years 
(until  1970,  this  was  one  year).  After  this  general 
course they have to make a choice of one of the two- 
year  vocational  specializations  which  the  school 
offers. 
Students are assumed to choose the specialization 
that  will lead to the greatest welfare. That  is, if we 
assume a utility function to exist, students will choose 
the alternative which delivers the greatest utility. 
This  utility will be influenced by the contents  of 
the study (consumption effect) and improvements in 
their labor market position (investment effect). Stu- 
dents  have  to calculate all these effects  in  order to 
evaluate their utility function. 
It is, of course, impossible to make such complex 
calculations. Hayek (1945, pp. 525-526) stresses this 
impossibility: "There is hardly anything that happens 
anywhere in the world that might not have an effect 
on the decision he ought to make". There are so many 
influences  upon  the  utility  that  it  is  impossible to 
evaluate them  all. But  from  Hayek's point of view 
all relevant information will, nevertheless, reach the 
decision maker: "We must look at the price system as 
such a mechanism for communicating information...". 
Because  of  the  market  system,  all  relevant  infor- 
mation,  except  for  individual  preferences,  will  be 
reflected in the price. 
This means that, but for individual preferences, the 
choice between the specializations would be determ- 
ined by the prices, i.e. the wages (and the direct costs 
of  the  human  capital  investment).  Hayek's  main 
assumption,  however,  is  the  existence  of a  perfect 
market and this assumption does not hold in the case 
of students' choices. 
There are two main factors that violate the perfect 
market assumption. The  first factor is that the  labor 
market  is  not  completely cleared by  wages,  which 
means  that  wages  do  not  reflect  all  relevant  infor- 
mation. There are other signals that also play a  part 
in the allocation process, for example the unemploy- 
ment  and  qualitative adjustments  for job character- 
istics. In  order to  study the choice behavior of stu- 
dents, these  factors  should  also be brought  into  the 
analysis. 
The second factor that violates Hayek's assumption 
is that equilibrium prices that would contain all rel- 
evant information do not in fact exist. The only wages 
that can be observed are current wages, but these are 
not what students are looking for. The wages that are 
relevant for their decisions are the future wages, the 
wages  prevailing  during  their  working  lives,  and 
especially the wages in the year in which they enter 
the  labor market.  But  futures  markets  generally do 
not exist on the labor market. 
The only way to overcome this problem is to form 
an expectation of these future wages. The information 
problem then  reappears in this calculation of expec- 
tations.  In  this  imperfect  situation,  choices  will  be 
based on expectations rather than  prices, and wages 
will not be the only relevant factor. 
The formation of adequate expectations will there- 
fore be rather difficult, and it is very likely that some 
people  are  better  equipped  than  others  to  perform 
such forecasts. Students have to make such important 
decisions only a few times in their careers, and they 
are  relatively  young  and  unexperienced  at  the 
moment they have to choose between different spe- 
cializations. It therefore seems not unlikely that the 
forecasts students are able to make might be consider- 
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future  labor market situation of different specializa- 
tions. 
In  this  analysis,  the  specializations are  clustered 
into three groups in order to integrate corresponding 
segments of the labor market and to avoid problems 
due  to  changing  classification  schemes  over  time, 
which  would  be  encountered  at  a  lower  level  of 
aggregation.  These  three  specializations  are:  the 
building industry  (B),  metal  industry  (M)  and  food 
and catering industry (F).  2 The  specific situation of 
these students, who have already invested one or two 
years in the general curriculum makes other alterna- 
tives (i.e. leaving school) relatively unattractive. 
Figure l  shows the changes in the numbers of stu- 
dents choosing one of these three specializations. The 
figure clearly shows that the total number of students 
has changed over time, and also that the distribution 
among the three specializations is far from constant. 
These changing choices might, apart from changes 
in  capabilities  and  the  students'  preferences,  be 
explained by changes in the situation in the labor mar- 
ket segments that these specializations give access to. 
The  basic  assumption  of this  study  is  that  students 
choose a specialization taking into account their pref- 
erences and the labor market prospects of vocational 
specializations. The distribution of preferences among 
students  is  not expected to change  markedly, while 
the labor market situation might change rapidly. 
One main argument in the choice is excluded from 
the analysis. That is attending a specialization in order 
to gain access to  a  higher type of education. Many 
schools have Some kind of entry requirements, and a 
diploma in one of the three specializations might meet 
such requirements. Although the number of students 
from junior secondary technical schools who continue 
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Figure 1.  Enrollments over time in the three specializations. 
recently become rather large, it is assumed that this 
argument does not play an important role in the cho- 
ice  of  a  specialization.  The  first  reason  for  this 
assumption is that it is likely that students defer their 
decision to continue education until the final exam is 
near. Another reason to neglect this point is that stu- 
dents  will  generally continue  their education  in  the 
same specialization, but at a higher level. The choice 
of a specialization is still made at the same moment; 
in  fact only the  length  of the course,  and  therefore 
the year they will enter the labor market, will be dif- 
ferent. Finally, in most years the number of students 
actually choosing further education is low. Thus the 
assumption will be made that it is the intention of all 
students  to join the  labor market at the end  of this 
specialization course. 
The  individual  decision  depends  on  preferences, 
capabilities and the  labor market situation.  Because 
preferences and capabilities are given for one student, 
they are constants in the choice function of that indi- 
vidual student. The  only variables in this individual 
choice function are related to the labor market situ- 
ation.  Because of the restricted data which is avail- 
able, the labor market situation is represented only by 
wages and the probability of getting a job in the three 
specializations. Because students do not know  these 
figures exactly, the choice function depends on their 
expectations of these figures, rather than  the  figures 
themselves. 
Wages are measured by the total sum of wages in 
sectors of industry related to a particular specializa- 
tion,  divided by  the  number  of people  working  in 
these sectors. The wages, defined this way, do not of 
course necessarily equal the wages of entrants, nor do 
they  equal  the  present  value  of life-cycle incomes. 
However, since in  The Netherlands most wages are 
regulated  by  collective  labor  agreements,  which 
strongly  determine  the  relationships  between  pay- 
ments for the different age groups, the average wage 
at the moment of entrance might be viewed as a suit- 
able  indicator of the  labor  market  situation  of the 
occupation. 
The probability of getting a job is defined by the 
number of people working in the relevant sectors, div- 
ided by the sum of the number of people working plus 
the number of unemployed with relevant occupations. 
Once  again, these figures represent the situation for 
the  whole occupational group, and at one particular 
time. 
Because a  choice has to be made between only a 
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be characterized by some critical values. Ceteris par- 
ibus, a shift in a wage leads to a different choice at the 
moment the wage reaches the critical value. Because 
preferences are not equal for everyone, these critical 
values are distributed among the students. 
On an aggregated level, this leads to a choice func- 
tion in which the fraction of students choosing a cer- 
tain  specialization  increases  as  the  expected  labor 
market prospects for that specialization improve. The 
better these labor market expectations, the more stu- 
dents will have passed their switching point. 
The choice function is assumed to have the follow- 
ing form: 
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in which Ci is the number of students choosing spe- 
cialization i (i = B,M,F),  ,w,+2i  is the expectation, for- 
med at t, of the wage at t + 2, the moment the student 
will enter the labor market, related to specialization 
i, and  ,P~+2, similarly, is the expected probability of 
getting a job at t + 2, formed at t, also for specializa- 
tion i. 
The ratio between the number of students choosing 
the  building industry rather than  the  metal  industry 
specialization also  depends  on  the  wage  and  prob- 
ability of getting a job by enrolling for the food and 
catering specialization. A  change in the labor market 
situation in the food and catering industry might have 
a differential impact on enrollments in the other two 
specializations, which  might  cause  a  change  in  the 
ratio. 
By assuming that choices only depend on relative 
wages and relative probabilities (i.e. by assuming the 
"income-effect" to be absent), equation (2.1) can for 
estimation purposes be reduced to: 
,= 
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(2.3) 
The  estimation will be based on this model with 
parameter restrictions, while the results will be pre- 
sented in terms of model (2.1), which has a more con- 
venient economic interpretation. 
Choice function (2. l) provides a model of students' 
choices in which the choices they make are a function 
of the expectations they have about the future labor 
market situation. Finally, this model has to be com- 
pleted with two alternative hypotheses about the way 
in which expectations are formed. 
As  was  noted  in  the  introduction,  there  are  two 
schools of thought in the economic literature regard- 
ing students' choices. The first is the cobweb theory, 
which  assumes  that  students  base  their  decisions 
entirely on the present rather than on the future labor 
market situation. In other words,  it is assumed that 
students expect the  future  situation to be similar to 
the present situation. Freeman is the most well-known 
propagator of this view. 
The  second  school  of thought  is  represented  by 
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dents  have  rational  expectations  about  the  future 
labor  market.  The  rational  expectations  theory 
assumes that students' expectations are the best poss- 
ible  expectations,  given  the  data  available  at  the 
moment choices have to be made. 
The position of these two models can be interpreted 
as different views with respect to students' ability to 
forecast.  Rational expectations assumes  that  if it is 
possible to forecast shifts in labor supply or demand 
students  will  indeed  forecast  this  change.  Students 
have a full capability to forecast, which is not domi- 
nated by any other forecast. 
The  cobweb  theory,  on  the  other  hand,  assumes 
that students have no capability at all to make such 
forecasts.  While it might  be  possible to  draw  con- 
clusions  about  future  changes  on  the  labor  market 
given the current information, students do not know 
how to make such inferences. Their lack of insight in 
the functioning of the labor market makes it imposs- 
ible for them to anticipate any change. The only way 
they can use labor market information is in its most 
direct form, as current wages or probabilities of get- 
ting a job. Without extra information, therefore, only 
information on the current labor market situation is 
available to students. 
Summarizing, there are two extreme situations, the 
cobweb and the rational expectations theory. The cob- 
web  theory  assumes  that  students  do  not  anticipate 
the  future  labor  market  situation  and  the  rational 
expectations theory  assumes that  students anticipate 
the future situation as perfect as possible. These the- 
odes are extremes, so the truth might be somewhere 
in between. 
3. THE ESTIMATION 
In order to investigate the use of information, both 
the  cobweb  model  and  the  rational  expectations 
model will be estimated. The  next  step will be  the 
comparison of the two models by an artificial nesting 
method.  The  analysis  will  determine  the  extent  to 
which one model is able to explain the  part of the 
data which is unexplained of the other model. 
The  first  model  to  be  estimated  is  the  cobweb 
model.  In equations  (2.2),  the  expectation variables 
have to be replaced by present wages, which leads to: 
: 
13,2  ~  ~,~2  , 
Y =  %71 
I  wB.  \I~22  l,,s\m 
•  --x-' 
c,"  {wy,  {pt',  ':' 
: 
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• 
(3.1) 
In this  model the choices are only influenced by 
predetermined  quantities,  so  ordinary  least  squares 
can be used for the estimation. To get a  linear equ- 
ation, the logarithm of both sides of the equations is 
taken. In this three equation model, in fact, two equa- 
tions determine all the  parameters of the third. The 
use of ordinary least squares means that these para- 
meter restrictions between the three equations will be 
automatically fulfilled.  To  allow  for  slow  changes 
in  preferences  or  the  schooling  system,  a 
(multiplicative) trend variable (t) has been added• 
The second model, with rational expectations, can- 
not be estimated directly by  ordinary least squares, 
since  the  expectation  variables  are  not  observed 
directly. Rational expectations will, in general, differ 
from  their future  realizations. Rational expectations 
are  only  the  best  possible  forecasts  at  a  certain 
moment (t) of this future realization (at t + 2), given 
the information available at this moment (t). McCal- 
lum (1976) has shown, however, that it is possible to 
use the realization of the future variables as a proxy 
for expectations of these future variables. These prox- 
ies  do,  in  that  case,  contain  an  error,  which  is  the 
unpredictable part of the variable. But if the equation 
is estimated by use of instrumental variables which 
are  known  at  the  moment  of forecasting,  the  esti- 
mation  will  be  consistent.  The  Appendix  provides 
details of this estimation procedure. 
Finally, a comparison between the two models will 
be performed. The test is based on a regression of the 
predictions of both models on the true values of the 
choice ratios: 
C~  CONST+A|~|  +(1-A)/~-~M| 
C,  M -  \  , / Co~w<~  \  C, /  Ro,~x,, 
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with 
2 
A  =  ~(~gatE~p  (3.3) 
2  2  ( 1  -  ~)(~Cobweb-~(~RatExp 
Equations (3.2) and (3.3) are based on a artificial  nest- 
ing procedure (Fisher and McAleer,  1981),  in which 
~. is the test-statistic for both hypotheses. Because the 
rational  expectations  model  includes  an  unobserved 
forecasting error it will show a larger standard error 
than  the cobweb model.  Equation (3.3) corrects this 
difference. 3 
If  the  cobweb  model  is  strictly  better  than  the 
rational  expectations  model  (i.e.  the rational  expec- 
tation  predictions  equal  the  cobweb  predictions 
except  for some  noise  not  correlated  with  the  real 
data),  ~  will  be  equal  to  1.  The  other  extreme  is 
where  ~.  equals  0.  In this  case  the  rational  expec- 
tations  model  dominates  the  cobweb  model.  The 
absolute  t-values indicate  the additional  information 
of the model, compared with the other model. 
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Table  1  presents  the  estimation  results  of the 
cobweb model, based on equations (2.1).  It contains 
six  "triangles".  Each triangle  shows the effects of a 
change in wages or the probability of getting a job 
(vertically) in one of the three sectors (horizontally), 
leaving all other variables constant.  For example,  if 
the probability of getting a job in the building indus- 
try (first triangle of the second row) increases by 1%, 
the ratio of students choosing building industry spe- 
cialization  and  students  choosing the metal  industry 
specialization increases by 2.72% (n12 in (2.1)).  Sig- 
nificant  effects  are  indicated  by  a  bold  arrow.  The 
level of significance is 90%, which corresponds to an 
absolute t-value greater than  1.703. 
All significant effects do have the correct sign. The 
significant  arrows  suggest  that  employment  prob- 
abilities  play an  important role in the choice of the 
building  industry  specialization,  while  wages  are 
most important  for the metal industry and food and 
catering.  The  insignificance  of the  other parameters 
might be  because  these  effects  are  rather  small,  or 
because  the  cobweb  assumption  about  expectations 
does not hold. 
Since  it  is  difficult to interpret  the parameters  of 
Table  1,  an  example  of the  size  of these  results  is 
presented  in Table  2.  In order to indicate  the trend, 
the  predicted  choices of  1951  and  1984  have  been 
calculated as if there were no wages or employment 
probability  differences  between  the  vocational 
choices. Furthermore, the table presents the predicted 
choices  in  1984,  based  on  actual  wages  and  prob- 
ability figures, and the changes in this distribution for 
a  1% change of one of the six labor market variables. 
Table  2  shows  that  the  growth  of the  food  and 
catering  specialization  is  endogenous: the growth is 
not  only  caused  by  an  increase  in  wages  or prob- 
abilities of getting a job. From 1951 to 1984 this spe- 
cialization grew, according to the model, 300%, even 
with no differences in wages and employment prob- 
abilities. 
In  1984,  the model predicts that the labor market 
situation caused 4956 students  to leave the building 
industry in favor mainly of the metal specialization. 
The elasticities  of supply  vary, but accord with  the 
general range found in similar studies. The maximum 
elasticity of supply with respect to wages is  2.9,  in 
the  food and catering  industry,  while  for the  prob- 
ability of getting a job the elasticity is highest, at 2.2, 
in the building industry. 
Table 3 shows the estimation results of the rational 
expectations model. Four out of the twelve labor mar- 
ket  effects  are  significant.  One  of these,  the  ratio 
between building and food and catering industry, has 
the wrong sign. 
Table  4  gives  an  example  of the rational  expec- 
tations  estimation  results,  analogous to Table  2.  As 
parameter restrictions  are not necessarily fulfilled in 
the rational expectations model, the parameters of the 
third equation, the ratio of the numbers choosing the 
metal industry versus the food and catering industry, 
have been derived from the other two equations.  In 
this  model  the  maximum  elasticity  of supply  with 
respect to wages is 5.5, again for food and catering, 
and  2.7  for the  probability  of getting  a job,  in  the 
metal industry. 
The  fit  of the  two  models  has  been  indicated  in 
Figures  2  and  3.  They show the percentage of stu- 
dents in a certain year who did not choose the special- 
ization which was predicted by the model. Although 
the  differences  between  the  estimation  techniques 
mean that a comparison between the cobweb model 
and the rational expectations model is not completely 
justified,  it  is  obvious that the  rational  expectations 
model  fits  less  well  than  the  cobweb  model.  It  is, 
however, not possible to draw final conclusions from 
this observation. 
In  order  to  get  an  indication  of the  influence  of 66  Economics of Education Review 
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the two hypotheses, the two extreme models will be 
compared. Zarkin (1983) mentions the difficulties of 
comparing  these  two  models.  A  comparison  of R- 
squared values will not suffice, because of the corre- 
lation of the explanatory variables of the two models. 
However, an artificial nesting test enables us to make 
a comparison. 
Table 5  gives the results of this test between the 
models. The parameter ~,, of equation (3.6) has been 
estimated for the three equations of the model. If the 
predictions of both the cobweb model and the rational 
expectation model are regressed on the real data, e.g. 
in the complete model of the building industry versus 
food  and  catering,  the  cobweb  predictions  have  a 
parameter value ~ of 0.90 and the rational expectation 
model a  1-~, of 0.10. If this parameter was a  1, and 
therefore the  parameter for the  other  model was  0, 
the model with a  ~, of 1 would, at the least, explain 
everything that is explained by the other model. The 
0-parameter model might be rather good, but it would 
be completely eclipsed by the other model. 
The table shows that in all cases the cobweb model 
has a higher parameter value than the rational expec- 
tations model, which implies that the cobweb model 
is a  better description than  the rational expectations 
model.  1-~. does not significantly differ from 0, and Labor Market Information  and the Choice of Vocational Specialization  67 
Table 2.  An example of the estimation results of the cobweb model (significant effects have been printed in bold type) 
Building  Metal  F&C 
1951 (all wages and prob. equal)  7079  14628  1707 
1984 (all wages and prob. equal)  18286  24623  5891 
1984 (actual wages and prob.)  13330  29518  5952 
change due to 1% rise of  +2  -84  +82 
wage B 
wage M  -79  +326  -247 
wage F  +73  -246  +173 
probability B  +293  -156  -137 
probability M  -247  -1  +248 
probability F  -46  +149  -104 
therefore k  does not significantly differ from  1.  On 
the other hand, ~, differs significantly from 0 at a 5% 
level (t26;o.o5= 1.706)  in only two of the three equations 
(B/M  and  B/F).  These  parameter estimates indicate 
that the performance of the cobweb model dominates 
that of the rational expectations model, although the 
t-tests indicate that  the evidence is not very strong. 
This might be due to the relatively short time-series. 
Overall, the analysis of this section shows that, in 
general,  the  cobweb  model  gives  better  estimation 
results,  and  also  predicts  better  than  the  rational 
expectations model. The implication of accepting the 
cobweb hypothesis is that students do make system- 
atic  errors  in  their anticipations of the  future  labor 
market situation. These errors will lead to mismatches 
when  the students enter the market. In the next sec- 
tion  some simulations will show  the extent of these 
mismatches. 
5. IMPLICATIONS 
Section 2 outlined two principal information prob- 
lems which students face in choosing their vocational 
specialization at junior secondary technical schools. 
Firstly, there is a time-lag between the choice of spe- 
cialization and labor market entry, and secondly, mar- 
kets are not fully cleared by wages. 
In this section the extent of this problem will be 
indicated using  the  estimation results  of section  4. 
The  results  in  this  section  are  rather  robust  with 
respect to these estimates. As mentioned before, the 
extent of the mismatch due to cobweb behavior is an 
indication of the desirability of public labor market 
forecasts to help students to anticipate future develop- 
ments. But this leads to the question of whether pro- 
fessional  forecasters  can  improve  students'  expec- 
tations. This issue will not be taken into account. 
In order to gauge the extent of the problem, a cri- 
terion for measurement is needed. The criterion used 
here is the number of students who (according to the 
estimated  supply  function)  would  have  chosen 
another specialization if they had had full information 
on  future  labor  market  prospects.  To  measure  this 
mismatch,  the  predicted  enrollment  for  two 
(hypothetical) situations is calculated. Firstly, the pre- 
dicted  enrollment  is  based  on  actual  labor  market 
figures,  according  to  the  cobweb  theory.  Secondly, 
the enrollment is recalculated using the labor market 
figures at t + 2.  This second enrollment indicates the 
hypothetical choice of students if they had known the 
future labor market situation. The difference between 
the two indicates the mismatch. 
Three observations have to be made about this cri- 
terion.  Firstly,  it  measures  only  aggregated,  net 
effects.  If one  student chooses the  metal  instead of 
the building industry, but another student chooses the 
building instead of the  metal industry, these  effects 
will not appear in the aggregated supply functions of 
the previous sections. Secondly, the criterion does not 
take  into  account  the  fact  that,  if  everybody  had 
chosen the right specialization, the labor market situ- 
ation would have been different. Finally, the criterion 
gives  every  mismatch  equal  weight,  although  there 
will be  some  students  who  made  a  wrong  decision 
who were almost indifferent between the "right" and 
the "wrong" decision, while for others, the costs of a 
wrong decision might be rather high. In general, this 
will  lead to  an  overestimation of small mismatches 
and an underestimation of large mismatches. 
In the light of the results of the estimation in the 
last section, it is assumed that the cobweb model is 
correct.  Thus,  students'  choices  are  completely 
determined by the present labor market situation. The 68  Economics of Education  Review 
Table 3.  Estimation of the rational expectations model (absolute t-values between brackets) 
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extent  of the  mismatch  is  measured,  based  on  the 
parameter estimations of the cobweb model. 
Figure 4 shows the fractions of students who made 
the wrong decision, per year. The proportions of stu- 
dents  making  a  wrong  decision  are  rather  high, 
especially in recent years: on average 3%  of all the 
students at the junior secondary technical schools, but 
over the  last ten  years an  average of 7%,  rising to 
almost 16%  in  1984. 
Figures 5,  6,  and 7 provide the same data for the 
three specializations separately. All three specializa- 
tions show an increase in recent years, but the change 
is most radical in the building industry. In the food 
and catering specialization, some high mismatch per- 
centages were found in the fifties. 
The extent of the problem is far from equal for the 
three specializations. In the building industry the frac- 
tion making the  "wrong"  decision is 9%  on  average 
and as high as 49% in  1980,  While the average in the 
metal industry is 4% with a maximum of 22% in 1984. 
The  food  and  catering  specialization  also  has  its 
maximum in 1984, at 60%, but in this sector high mis- 
match rates also appeared in the fifties, with e.g. 27% 
in  1956.  In this sector the average mismatch is  12%. 
The  mismatch fractions indicated in these  figures 
might be seen as an indication for the value of correct 
information. If correct information was available this 
fraction of students would have chosen correctly, and 
thus this many students would be better off. Although 
it will not be possible for professional forecasters to Labor Market Information and the Choice of Vocational Specialization  69 
Table  4.  An example of the estimation results of the rational expectations model (significant effects have been printed in 
bold type) 
Building  Metal  F&C 
1951 (all wages and prob. equal)  5560  15754  2100 
1984  (all wages and prob. equal)  16486  25030  7284 
1984  (actual wages and prob.)  14702  28743  5355 
change due to  1% rise of  -98  +42  +56 
wage B 
wage M  +182  +152  -334 
wage F  +90  -205  +295 
probability B  +214  -137  -80 
probability M  -1156  +770  +387 
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Figure3.  Misspecification  of  the  rational  expectations 
model. 
Table 5,  Comparison of cobweb and rational expectations 
model (t-value between brackets) 
B/M  B/F  M/F 
~,  0.87  0.90  0.76 
(1.77)  (1.77)  (I.33) 
1-~  0.13  0.10  0.24 
(0.27)  (0.19)  (0.41 ) 
C  --0.78  1.52  2.30 
(34.00)  (28.57)  (35.89) 
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Figure 4.  The overall mismatch. 
'84 
predict the future labor market situation perfectly, the 
measure of the potential value of correct information 
might be  seen as  the opportunity  cost of not having 
better predictions. 
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Figure 6.  Mismatch  in the metal  industry. 
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Figure  9.  Value of information about the probability of get- 
ting a job. 
broken down into information about wages and about 
the  probability of getting a job. The  figures  lead to 
two important conclusions. Firstly, the value of infor- 
mation about wages is decreasing, while the value of 
information  about  employment  probabilities  is 
increasing. Secondly, while the value of information 
about  wages averages  only  0.9%  before  1972  and 
0.4%  after  1972,  the value of information about the 
probability  of  getting  a  job  averages  0.9%  before 
1972 and as much as 5.7% after  1972. 
The  decrease  in  the  value  of  information  about 
wages  might be explained by the increasing rigidity 
of wages. If wages do not change much, the value of 
knowing future  wages  rather  than present  wages  is 
not big. But this wage rigidity means that the fluctu- 
ations in the probability of getting a job have risen. 
If wages  do  not regulate the  allocation process,  the 
unemployment  rate  will  take  over  this  task.  The Labor Market Information and the Choice of Vocational Specialization  71 
increase in the total mismatch might have two alterna- 
tive explanations. Firstly, it might be that allocation 
performed by unemployment  rates is more costly than 
allocation performed by wages, from an information 
point  of  view.  Secondly,  labor  market  fluctuations 
might have increased in recent years, so that the total 
costs have also increased. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this article has been to investigate the 
information problem which  students are  faced  with 
when making a choice between alternative vocational 
specializations. On the one hand, the labor market is 
very complex, while on the other hand students who 
have to make their educational choice are rather unex- 
perienced, and make such choices only a few times 
during their career.  Such a situation might make it a 
desirable policy to  assist students'  choices  by pub- 
lishing detailed medium-term labor market forecasts 
of the labor market position of the various vocational 
specializations. Such forecasts will probably be most 
important for  vocational courses  which  are  closely 
connected to  a  specific  labor  market  segment,  and 
which therefore have a relative high risk of suffering 
from changes in the labor market situation. 
Section 4 has shown that the labor market situation 
does  indeed play a  role in the  choice of vocational 
specialization. These results are  in accordance with 
other  literature  in this  field.  The  estimation results 
showed that there does seem to be an influence, from 
both wages and the probability of getting a job, on 
students' choices. Table 2  shows that about  10% of 
the students in 1984 made a choice that differed from 
the notional choice had there been no differences in 
wages  or  employment  probabilities  between  the 
vocational specializations. The  estimations indicate 
that the probability of getting a job is rather important 
for  the  building industry, while  wages  are  a  more 
important factor in choosing the metal industry and 
the food and catering specialization. 
The question of whether students are able to antici- 
pate future labor market changes seems to be answered 
negatively. We  approached  this  question  using two 
extreme  models:  the  cobweb model and the  rational 
expectations model. Both models have been estimated 
and a comparison has been made by means of an arti- 
ficial nesting test. It is, however, difficult to draw clear 
conclusions from these  tests.  Most statistics  seem to 
indicate better performance from the cobweb model, 
although the evidence is not very strong. 
Finally we  investigated the  extent  of  the  infor- 
mation problem, assuming that the cobweb model is 
the true model. The mismatch due to the information 
time-lag in this model was as high as  16%  in 1984. 
The building industry specialization and the food and 
catering specialization are most affected by this prob- 
lem. Another interesting conclusion is that the value 
of  additional  information  about  future  wages  is 
decreasing over time, while the value of information 
about  the  probability  of  getting  a  job  has  been 
increasing in recent years. 
The mismatches measured are rather large. By pro- 
viding good predictions about the future labor market 
situation, these mismatches might be remedied. The 
extent of the information problem calculated in this 
article indicates that,  if it is possible to improve stu- 
dents' forecasts substantially, there would be a  very 
valuable improvement in the  relation between edu- 
cation and the labor market. 
NOTES 
1.  In the Netherlands these schools are called LTS (Lower Technical School) and ITO (Individual Techni- 
cal Education). 
2.  The data consists of figures about the number of students in the first year of specialisation, their wages 
and the probability of getting a job in the three economic sub-sectors (the building industry, metal 
industry and food and catering industry) from 1949 till 1986. Because the instruments contain a two- 
year lag, and because expectations must be formed of the situation two years in the future, the estimation 
is restricted to the period 1951 till  1984. The enrolment for  1972 is missing, due to the one-year 
extension of the general curriculum in 1971. In 1971, first-year students had to decide about their 
specialization, while the cohort of 1972 had to make this decision after their second year (in 1973). 
Simultaneously, the total length of the courses changed from three to four years, so the length of the 
specialization period has remained constant. 
The figures have been taken from The Statistics  of the Junior  Secondary  Vocational Education, 
Monthly  Bulletin of Socio-Economic  Statistics  and National Accounts,  published by the Netherlands 
Central Bureau of Statistics (C.B.S.). 
3.  ~. is only identified in (4.6) if O2b~.eb,OZ,E~p are known. Since they are not known directly, they are 
replaced by their estimates, which is in fact incorrect because they may be estimates based on an 72  Economics of Education  Review 
incorrect model. An incorrect model will, however, lead to an over-estimation of t52, which will lead 
to a correction of 2L in favor of the false model. 
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APPENDIX:  THE ESTIMATION OF THE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS MODEL 
73 
The estimation of the rational expectations model is based upon the procedure of Cumby, Huizinga and Obstfeld (1983)• 
Following McCallum (1976) they use realizations of future variables as proxies for the expectations. Therefore, equations 
(2.2) can be rewritten, including these proxies, as: 
C~  [w~- \m,  /,,n  \vi, 
--  =  (3~1"  r*2  .  /~t42 
Cff  3.  F  "  F 
(A.I) 
By taking logarithms on both sides of the equation, the model becomes linear. An additive error term is added.  This 
transformation implies implicitly that students' expectations are assumed to be rational in the sense that their expectation 
of the logarithm of e.g.  the wage equals the expected value of the logarithm of the future wage.  If the variancy of the 
prediction errors are relatively small, this approximately equals a specification in which expectations are rational with respect 
to the wage itself.  Which operationalisation is more correct depends on the form of students' (cardinal) utility function. 
Because rational expectations are by definition the best possible expectations, the difference between these expectations 
and their realizations cannot be correlated with the expectations, so there has to be a correlation between this error-term 
and the proxy-variable (the realization). Furthermore, since the lag between the moment of choice and the entrance onto 
the labor market (which is 2  in this case) is more than one year, the periods of prediction are overlapping. This means 
that unpredictable events occurring in the overlapping year will be part of the error term in both years,  which causes 
autocorrelation. Thus, the error term in this model is both autocorrelated and correlated with the proxy-variables. Using 
OLS in such a  situation would lead to an estimation that is biased because of the correlation with the variables and not 
efficient because of the autocorrelation. Estimation with OLS would be consistent with the assumption of perfect foresight. 
The expectations are, in that case, assumed to be equal to the realization of wages and the probability of getting a job. 
According to the rational expectations theory, they are however only an approximation. Cumby, Huizinga and Obstfeld 
(1983) suggest an estimator for such models (a two-step two-stage least squares estimator), which is both efficient and 
unbiased. Nijman (1990) provides the formulas of the estimator in the linear model. 
The model is estimated with lagged variables as instruments for endogenous variables, which are correlated with the 
error term, and this estimation is carried out twice• In the first step no autocorrelation is assumed, and in the second step 
autocorrelation estimates taken from the first step are used. A disadvantage of this procedure is that the parameter restrictions 
between the three equations will not be automatically fulfilled. 
The  wage and the probability of getting a job at moment t,  t -  I  and t -  2  have been used as  instruments for the 
expectations. Since these figures are assumed to be known at t, they do not, under the definition of rational expectations, 
correlate with the error-term, which includes the difference between expectation and realization. 
The covariance-matrix fl has been estimated using the residuals (e) of the first step 2SLS estimation. Because of the 
first-order autocorrelation (MA(1)) of the error term, and the gap in 1972, the covariance-matrix has the following structure: 
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1) = ee' provides data  for estimating the  parameters  ~2,  p,  leading to  an  estimation of the  covariance-matrix with  the 
structure  of (3.3)  fl. 
Representing the fight-hand variables of (A.1) by X, the left-hand variable by y, and the matrix of instruments  by Z, 
the estimator of Cumby, Huizinga and Obstfeid (1983)  becomes: 
Ocno = (X'Z(Z'(IZ)-JZ'X)-'x'Z(Z'•Z)-'Z'y  (A.3) 